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Case Note
CRIMINAL LAW—A Canonical Conundrum Concerning Cannabis:
How Wyoming’s Supreme Court Ignored Its Own Interpretive
Rules and Read a Medical Marijuana Defense Out of the Law,
Burns v. State, 246 P.3d 283 (Wyo. 2011)
Matt J. Stannard *
Introduction
Wyoming lies between two states that have legalized the medical use of
marijuana, Montana and Colorado.1 Reluctant to consider medical use, and
concerned with the potential encroachment of marijuana users from surrounding
states, in 2011 the Wyoming Legislature eliminated a statutory exception to the
state’s marijuana law.2 Until eliminated, that exception potentially permitted an
affirmative defense for marijuana and some other controlled substances obtained

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2013. I would like to thank Case Note Editors
Kyle Ridgeway and Jared Miller for their patient and enthusiastic assistance, and Professors Stewart
Young and Sam Kalen for very helpful suggestions and feedback.
1
Colorado passed Amendment 20 in 2000, establishing the state’s Medical Marijuana
Registry. Colo. Ballot Amend. 20 (2000) (codified as Medical Use of Marijuana for Persons
Suffering from Debilitating Conditions, Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14). The Colorado statute
enforces professional conduct and provides strict penalties for medical professionals erroneously
recommending marijuana use. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-36-118(g)(I-X)(2012). Patients may possess
and consume marijuana upon a Colorado physician’s conclusion “that the patient might benefit
from the medical use of marijuana . . . .” Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(2)(a)(II). Colorado’s
constitutional amendment was the subject of considerable controversy in the state, with the
Governor discouraging doctors from approving marijuana under threat of federal law. Andrew J.
Boyd, Medical Marijuana and Personal Autonomy, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1253, 1263–64 n.82
(2004); see also Michael Berkey, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal Tango, 9
Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 417, 431 (2011) (stating that Colorado joined a wave of states
in legalizing medical use of marijuana including Maine, Nevada, and Hawaii in 1999–2000).

Montana voters approved Initiative 148 in 2004, protecting medical marijuana users from
civil or criminal penalties for medical use. See Montana Medical Marijuana Act, Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 50-46-101 to -210 (2009); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-46-201(1) (2007); Troy E. Grandel, One
Toke Over the Line: The Proliferation of State Medical Marijuana Laws, 9 U. N.H. L. Rev. 135, 146
(2010); Ari Lieberman & Aaron Solomon, A Cruel Choice: Patients Forced to Decide Between Medical
Marijuana and Employment, 26 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 619, 624 (2009).
See More from the Capitol: Your Legislature at Work, Wyo. Emp’t Law Letter (March,
2011); see also Steve Elliot, Medical Marijuana Called Unlikely in Wyoming, Toke of the Town
(Sep. 28, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://www.tokeofthetown.com/2011/09/medical_marijuana_called_
unlikely_in_wyoming.php (stating that state senators speculated Wyoming was unlikely to follow
neighboring states in allowing medical marijuana use); Bob Vines, Medical Marijuana in Wyo.? Not
Likely, Wyo. Trib.-Eagle, Sep. 28, 2011, at A1 (stating that Wyoming is hostile to other states’
relaxation of marijuana prohibitions).
2
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pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a medical practitioner.3 The Wyoming
Legislature voted overwhelmingly to close that loophole, leaving medical
marijuana users without any defense for the criminality of possession and use
in Wyoming.4
The point may have been moot. Only weeks earlier, the Wyoming Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction of Colorado resident Daniel Joseph Burns for
marijuana possession, even though Burns asserted he obtained the marijuana
in accordance with Colorado’s medical marijuana law.5 Arrested under section
35-7-1031 of the Wyoming Statutes,6 Burns argued that he obtained the marijuana
in his possession pursuant to the valid prescription or order of a practitioner
in Colorado under that state’s medical marijuana law.7 The State of Wyoming
successfully quashed that defense through a motion in limine, and Burns offered
a conditional guilty plea as he appealed the denial of his affirmative defense to the
Wyoming Supreme Court.8 The court affirmed Burns’s conviction the following
January, holding that the Wyoming statute did not exempt a defendant from
criminal liability even if the defendant obtained a legitimate medical marijuana
exception under Colorado law.9
The decision in Burns and the Legislature’s subsequent revocation of the
statutory exception in 35-7-1031 illustrate the political challenges in jurisdictions
that border medical marijuana states. Since California became the first state to do
so in 1996, fifteen other states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical
marijuana.10 Despite an aggressive federal anti-narcotics policy that refuses to
acknowledge any medical benefits to marijuana use,11 federal intervention has

The old statutory exception read: “It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to a
valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice,
or except as otherwise authorized by this act.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2009). The new
statute adds the following clarification: “[N]otwithstanding any other provision of this act, no
practitioner shall dispense or prescribe marihuana, tetrahydrocannabinol, or synthetic equivalents
of marihuana or tetrahydrocannabinol and no prescription or practitioner’s order for marihuana,
tetrahydrocannabinol, or synthetic equivalents of marihuana or tetrahydrocannabinol shall be
valid.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2011).
3

4

Vines, supra note 2, at A1.

5

See generally Burns v. State, 246 P.3d 283 (Wyo. 2011).

6

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) (2009).

7

Burns, 246 P.3d at 284.

8

Id. at 285.

9

Id. at 286.

10

See infra note 34 and accompanying text.

Jared Bayer, Comment, Re-balancing State and Federal Power: Toward a Political Principle of
Subsidiarity in the United States, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 1421, 1435–37 (2004) (stating that while states
liberalize marijuana laws, the federal government refuses to enact similar changes).
11
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not slowed several states’ moves toward legalization.12 Estimates of the number
of legal marijuana users range from 730,000 to 1.5 million.13 States prohibiting
marijuana will inevitably face the challenge of how to respond to visitors bringing
medical marijuana across the border.14
This note argues that the Wyoming Supreme Court reached an erroneous
holding in Burns. It did so by ignoring its well-defined interpretive cannons of
statutory construction and by disregarding a specific exception in the Wyoming
statute allowing for marijuana “obtained directly from or pursuant to a valid
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice.”15 While the Wyoming Legislature jettisoned the statutory exception for
medical marijuana shortly after the Burns decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court
erred in reading the exception out of the law prior to the Legislature’s actions.
By outlining the history of medical marijuana policy,16 surveying the relevant
interpretive canons of statutory construction,17 and analyzing the language
of section 35-7-1031(c)(iii) under those interpretive cannons,18 this note will
demonstrate that the court should have allowed Burns to present an affirmative

Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked
Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421, 1423 (2009) (noting that states continued
to enact medical marijuana legislation post-Raich).
12

Kris Lotlikar, The First Ever Investor-Grade Analysis of the Medical Marijuana Markets, Med.
Marijuana Mkts. (Mar. 23, 2011), http://medicalmarijuanamarkets.com/see-change-strategyreleases-the-state-of-the-medical-marijuana-markets-2011-the-first-ever-investor-grade-analysisof-the-medical-marijuana-markets-in-the-u-s (reporting the findings of survey responses and
interviews conducted by See Change Strategy LLC, which the author identifies as “an independent
financial analysis firm that specializes in new and unique markets”); Russ Belville, America’s One
Million Legal Marijuana Users, The Normal Stash Blog (Mar. 28, 2011), http://stash.norml.org/
americas-one-million-legal-marijuana-users (reporting figures compiled by the author from state
medical marijuana registries and patient estimates).
13

See, e.g., Kenneth Falcon, A Lesson in Legalization: Successes and Failures of California’s
Proposition 19, 9 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 463, 484 (2011) (noting that large-scale marijuana
production in California incentivizes illegal transportation into its neighboring states); Alex Kreit,
Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 Chap. L.
Rev. 555, 576 (2010) (discussing the need for “controls and incentives to prevent against negative
externalities in the form of spillover effects in neighboring states”); Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism
and Drug Control, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 783, 868 (2004) (speculating that marijuana may be easily
purchased in a liberalizing state and carried across borders, and that the price of marijuana would
fall in both states as a result); Beau Kilmer et al., Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in
Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help?, RAND Corp. (2010), http://www.rand.
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf (noting the likelihood of
interstate transportation of marijuana if it is legalized in California).
14

15

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) (2009); see supra note 3 (explaining the previous statute).

16

See infra notes 25–72 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 73–142 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 166–216 and accompanying text.
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defense of legitimate marijuana possession. If the State of Wyoming had a policy
interest in discouraging the transportation of medical marijuana from Colorado
into Wyoming, the proper remedy was legislative—evidenced by the subsequent
action by the Wyoming Legislature rescinding the statutory exception in section
35-7-1031(c)(iii).19

Background
America’s controlled substance policies inhabit several legal intersections,
including federal and state law,20 criminal and constitutional law,21 and the
fields of law and medicine.22 The criminalization of marijuana in U.S. history
was accompanied by an equivalent retreat from objective analysis of marijuana’s
medical possibilities.23 In recent years, political forces in favor of restoring
marijuana’s medical uses have clashed with political forces bent on keeping the
substance categorically illegal.24

19

See infra notes 105–06, 203–04 and accompanying text.

See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Controlled Substance Law: Cannabis, Compassionate Use and the
Commerce Clause: Why Developments in California May Limit the Constitutional Reach of the Federal
Drug Laws, 1999 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 471, 523–25 (1999) (suggesting California citizens may be
able to prove the completely intrastate nature of marijuana cultivation and distribution); see generally
Gregory W. Watts, Note, Gonzales v. Raich: How to Fix a Mess of “Economic” Proportions, 40 Akron
L. Rev. 545 (2007) (noting the conflict between federal and state orientations toward marijuana
and advocating a neo-Federalist approach to the interaction of federal and state marijuana laws).
20

21
See Martin D. Carcieri, Obama, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Drug War, 44 Akron
L. Rev. 303, 307–08 (2011) (arguing marijuana prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine of bodily autonomy); see generally Andrew King, Comment, What
the Supreme Court Isn’t Saying About Federalism, the Ninth Amendment, and Medical Marijuana, 59
Ark. L. Rev. 755 (2006) (subjecting the United States’ arguments in Gonzalez v. Raich to Ninth
Amendment enumerated right analysis).
22
See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 641–43 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
(noting that several studies contradict the government’s position that marijuana has no medical use);
see generally Alex Kreit & Aaron Marcus, Recent Developments in Health Care Law: Raich, Health
Care, and the Commerce Clause, 31 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 957 (2004) (describing the impact of
Raich on several traditionally state-overseen medical practices).
23
See Alex Kreit, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the States Grow Their Own?, 151
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787, 1793–94 (2003) (noting that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 accepted medical
use of marijuana but made acquisition of the drug economically difficult, while the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970 finally eliminated medical use of marijuana).

See Matthew A. Christiansen, A Great Schism: Social Norms and Marijuana Prohibition,
4 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 229, 233 (2010) (describing the disconnect between federal marijuana
policy and the government’s own research suggesting the relative harmlessness of marijuana); Kreit,
supra note 23, at 1796 (recounting the government’s refusal to hold hearings on reclassification of
marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II despite administrative judge’s conclusion that marijuana
is “one of the safest therapeutically active substances known to man”).
24
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A Brief History of Medical Marijuana
People have used marijuana medicinally for thousands of years.25 In the United
States, marijuana enjoyed legal medical status until the federal criminalization of
cannabis in 1937.26 Wyoming’s deference to a medical approach to the plant was
evident in 1913, when the Legislature listed Indian hemp as a narcotic requiring
a prescription except for small dilute amounts.27 Criminal possession of cannabis
followed in 1929, but without explicit repeal of allowances for prescriptionapproved use.28 With the adoption of the federal Uniform Narcotic Drug Act in
1937, cannabis and cannabis extract were banned recreationally, but continued to
be authorized in Wyoming for distribution by prescription.29 Such prescription
use remained legal until the Uniform Controlled Substances Act was adopted and
the Uniform Narcotics Act was repealed in 1971.30
Support for the legalization of medical marijuana began in earnest in the
1990s.31 In 1995, California voters approved Proposition 215 via referendum,
codified as the California Compassionate Use Act (CCUA) in 1996.32 The
Act exempted physicians, patients, and primary caregivers who possessed or
cultivated marijuana, for medical purposes, with the recommendation or approval
of a physician, from criminal prosecution.33 Since the passage of the CCUA,
fifteen other states, and the District of Columbia, have passed laws allowing
medical marijuana.34

See Lester Grinspoon & James B. Bakalar, Marihuana: The Forbidden Medicine 32–35
(rev. ed. 1997).
25

See Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread II, The Marijuana Conviction: A
History of Marijuana Prohibition in the United States 92–117 (1999).
26

27

1913 Wyo. Sess. Laws 101.

28

1929 Wyo. Sess. Laws 67.

29

1937 Wyo. Sess. Laws 208.

30

1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws 477.

31

See Gouldin, supra note 20, at 471–72, 481–82.

32

See Watts, supra note 20, at 558 n.87 (citing Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5

(c-d)).
33

Id. at 558.

Those states, in addition to California, are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington. See Alaska Stat. § 17.37.040 (2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-2801 (2011)
(Arizona Medical Marijuana Act); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-43.3-101 (2011) (Colorado Medical
Marijuana Code); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16 § 4901A (2011) (The Delaware Medical Marijuana Act);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 329-121 (2011); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22 § 2383-B (2011); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 333.26422 (2011) (Michigan Medical Marihuana Act); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-46-101 (2011);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453A.250 (2011); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 24:6I-1 (2011) (New Jersey Compassionate
Use Marijuana Act); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2B-3 (2011) (Lynn and Erin Compassionate Use Act);
Oregon Medical Marijuana Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.309 (2009); R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-28.6-1
(2011) (The Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act); Vt. Stat. Ann.
34
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The federal government did not concede that the wave of state-level
legalization represented a rejoinder to its unwavering opposition to medical
marijuana use.35 Justice Departments under Presidents Bill Clinton and George
W. Bush applied political pressure against states that had approved medical
marijuana measures, and conducted several raids on dispensaries and individual
users, particularly in California.36 The constitutionality of these actions was upheld
in 2001 in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative 37 and in 2006
by Gonzales v. Raich.38 In Raich, the United States Supreme Court overturned an
injunction granted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
preventing the federal government from interfering with the use of marijuana by
two California residents.39 The Court ruled that under the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution, Congress may criminalize the production
and use of home-grown marijuana even where states approve its use for
medicinal purposes.40
Whatever the rhetorical force of Raich, it was clear that the federal government
had neither the resources nor the will to destroy every medical marijuana operation
in California, let alone in other medical marijuana states.41 Raich did nothing to
slow the movement of states toward legalizing medical marijuana.42 The states’
disregard of the federal mandate has led scholars to speculate that marijuana’s
days as a Schedule I controlled substance might be numbered.43 Although the
tit. 18 § 4472 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 69.51A.040 (2011). The District of Columbia legalized
medical marijuana in 2010. See Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Initiative of 1999
(Act), D.C. Code § 7-1671.01 (2011).
35
See Berkey, supra note 1, at 429–30 (stating that the Departments of Justice and Health and
Human Services responded with immediate hostility to passages of Proposition 200 in Arizona and
215 in California).
36
See Pete Brady, California Under Siege, Cannabis Culture (May 14, 2002), http://www.
cannabisculture.com/articles/2305.html.
37

532 U.S. 483 (2001).

38

545 U.S. 1 (2005).

39

Id. at 10.

40

Id. at 27.

See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Deputy Attorney Gen. to Selected U.S.
Attorneys, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct.
19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf (stating that “prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended
treatment regimen consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous
compliance with existing state law who provide such individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an
efficient use of limited federal resources”).
41

42

See Berkey, supra note 1, at 435; Mikos, supra note 12, at 1423.

See Carcieri, supra note 21, at 308 (predicting that, if reelected in 2012, President Obama
will encourage Congress to end federal marijuana prohibition and allow states to develop their
own laws within federal guidelines); Kreit, supra note 14, at 565–66 (predicting increased medical
legalization and eventually recreational legalization at the state level); Mikos, supra note 12, at 1423.
Schedule I drugs under the Controlled Substances Act are drugs found to have a high potential for
43
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federal government has disputed the medical benefits of marijuana,44 in 2009, the
U.S. Attorney General directed federal prosecutors to back away from medical
marijuana patients in states where medical use was legal.45 However, in October of
2011, federal prosecutors began targeting medical marijuana dispensary owners
in California, warning owners of buildings housing dispensaries that they were
violating federal laws and could be subject to property seizures.46 Medical marijuana
advocates responded by filing lawsuits in California’s four federal judicial districts,
requesting court orders to halt U.S. attorneys from closing dispensaries.47

Medical Marijuana in Wyoming
Wyoming’s controlled substances statute paralleled the federal statute enacted
in 1971.48 Wyoming vigorously prosecuted the recreational use of, and trafficking
in, marijuana.49 However, Wyoming seemed willing to entertain an exception for
the medical use of otherwise illicit drugs. Prior to 2011, subsection (c) of section
35-7-1031 of the Wyoming Statutes contained an affirmative defense applying
only to possession charges, covering possession of a controlled substance “obtained
directly from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while
acting in the course of his professional practice.”50 The first opportunity for the
Wyoming Supreme Court to examine this exception occurred in Pool v. State,
decided in 2001.51 In Pool, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly
denied his motion for acquittal based on the State’s failure to prove he did not

abuse, no currently accepted medical use in treatment, and a lack of accepted safety use for the drug
under medical supervision. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2011). Except as specifically authorized, it is illegal
for any person to distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense,
a controlled substance; or to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute
or dispense, a counterfeit substance, of a Schedule I drug. Id. The extensive list of Schedule I
substances includes opiates, opiate derivatives, psychedelic substances, depressants, stimulants, and
other listings. Id.
See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Dismisses Medical Benefit from Marijuana, N.Y. Times (Apr. 21,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/21/health/21marijuana.html.
44

See M. Alex Johnson, DEA to Halt Medical Marijuana Raids, MSNBC.com (Feb. 27, 2009,
5:42 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29433708/ns/health-health_care/t/dea-halt-medicalmarijuana-raids/.
45

See Tim Fernholz, Deciphering the White House Jihad Against Pot, CBSNews.com
(Nov. 9, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-215_162-57321294/deciphering-thewhite-house-jihad-against-pot/.
46

47
See John Hoeffel, Medical Marijuana Advocates Sue to Halt Dispensary Closings, L.A. Times
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/08/local/la-me-pot-suits-20111108.
48

1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws 477.

See generally Jon Gettman, Marijuana in Wyoming: Arrests, Usage, and Related Data,
Bulletin of Cannabis Reform (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.drugscience.org/States/WY/WY.pdf
(tracking arrest and usage statistics for marijuana in Wyoming).
49

50

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2009).

51

17 P.3d 1285 (2001).
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have a valid prescription for methamphetamine.52 The court held that the State
did not have to prove a negative; the defendant’s lack of a prescription was not
an element of the possession charge to be positively established.53 Rather, the
statutory exception was an affirmative defense.54
Between Pool and the principal case, Burns, the Wyoming Supreme Court did
not hear any criminal cases related to medical marijuana. However, in Tarraferro
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Medical Commission, the court arguably established a
precedent of deference to physicians concerning marijuana-related substances.55
In Tarraferro, the court heard the appeal of a claimant who had used Marinol,
a pharmaceutical drug whose active ingredient is also found in marijuana, as
a pain medication for an inguinal hernia.56 The Wyoming Workers Safety and
Compensation Division denied payment for the medication, and the Wyoming
Medical Commission affirmed that denial, ruling that Marinol was experimental
and unnecessary.57 The court reversed the Commission’s ruling, deferring to the
treating physician’s testimony that the use of Marinol was reasonable, necessary,
and non-experimental.58 The court noted the physician’s expertise in pain
management and his pharmacological knowledge,59 concluding that although
use of Marinol was “novel,” it was not experimental.60 The court contrasted the
physician’s testimony with the cursory research done by the Commission,61 finding
“[t]hat Marinol was a reasonable and necessary, non-experimental treatment for
Tarraferro’s pain.” 62
Burns presented the next opportunity for the Wyoming court to address the
affirmative defense.63 Shortly after the decision in Burns, the Wyoming Legislature
amended section 35-7-1031(c) to explicitly exclude physician-prescribed medical

52

Id. at 1287.

53

Id. at 1288.

54

Id.

55

123 P.3d 912 (Wyo. 2005).

56

Id. at 913.

57

Id. at 914.

58

Id. at 919.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 918.

62

Id. at 920.

The case and the subsequent legislative elimination of section 35-7-1021(c)(iii) of the
Wyoming Statutes created a small ripple of national publicity, raising questions about the state’s
compassion for medical users, as well as its respect for the laws of a neighboring state. See Wyoming
Bill Wouldn’t Recognize Medical Pot Cards, Billings Gazette (Feb. 17, 2011, 9:15 AM), http://
billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/article_444944b0-3ab1-11e0-9826001cc4c03286.html.
63

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol12/iss2/7

8

Stannard: Criminal Law - A Canonical Conundrum Concerning Cannabis: How Wyo

2012

Case Note

461

marijuana.64 Then, in Bruyette v. State, decided a few months after Burns, the
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence
relating to the defendant’s possession of a California medical marijuana card.65 The
defendant informed the police at the time of his arrest for marijuana possession
that he had obtained the marijuana in California with a medical prescription
card.66 The District Court, as in Burns, granted the State’s motion in limine to
exclude evidence relating to a medical marijuana defense, and even took the
additional step of instructing the jury that medical use of marijuana was not a
defense.67 In his appeal, Bruyette argued that his constitutional right under Article
1 Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution to present a defense had been denied
by the district court’s ruling.68 The court noted that the right to present a defense
is limited to the presentation of “relevant” evidence.69 The court referenced
its earlier decision in Burns, where it had pointed out that, since possession of
marijuana is illegal, it would be illegal under Wyoming law for a physician to
prescribe, or a patient to possess, marijuana. This meant that the possession of a
medical marijuana card from a California physician was irrelevant.70 The trifecta
of Burns, Bruyette, and the legislative elimination of the statutory exception in
section 35-7-1031(c) amounted to a decisive stance in the State of Wyoming
against medical-based defenses of marijuana charges.
What makes Burns unique, however, is that Burns’s defense raised the statutory
exception specifically, and it was the sole basis of his appeal.71 The court had to
interpret the language of the statute to determine whether the recommendation
of a Colorado physician constituted a valid order or prescription as contemplated
by the exception.72

Statutory Interpretation: Plain Meaning vs. Term-of-Art
When interpreting statutory language, courts normally first look to the plain
meaning of the words in a statute.73 If statutory language is clear, courts need not
look outside the statute (e.g., to its legislative history) to determine the statute’s

64
See supra note 3 (describing differences between the old statutory exception and the new
statutory language).
65

253 P.3d 512 (Wyo. 2011).

66

Id. at 513.

67

Id. at 512.

68

Id. at 514.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 515.

71

See Burns v. State, 246 P.3d 283, 284 (Wyo. 2011).

72

Id.

73

See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
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meaning.74 Courts will thus look to the dictionary definition of statutory terms
to discern their plain meaning, since dictionaries presumably provide the most
common, universal definitions of words.75
Sometimes words in statutes are meant to denote usage in specialized fields or
professions, such as medicine, law, or other industries. In such instances, courts
may find it more reasonable to discern the meanings of those terms relative to
their context in the fields they are meant to represent.76 Courts in those instances
examine whether the surrounding words are similarly technical, and whether the
legislature intended the statute to employ the meanings found in those particular
fields.77 The guiding principle in term-of-art interpretation is that words or
phrases that have acquired, or are intended for, technical or particular meanings,
should be assigned those meanings when used in appropriate contexts.78
The United States Supreme Court’s treatment of ordinary and special
meaning is instructive. In Williams v. Taylor, the Court explained that, absent
an indication Congress intended differently, statutory language lends itself to
ordinary and common meaning. 79 Congress’s inclusion of other technical terms,
or the indication of an obviously contextual setting, indicates intent to define
terms technically.80 When a phrase has acquired the status of a term-of-art, it has
a narrower, more limited meaning than the same phrase would have under a plain
language interpretation.81 The Court will not assume that Congress intended

See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994); Yule Kim, Statutory Interpretations:
General Principles and Recent Trends 2–3 (1998).
74

See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(turning to the dictionary after noting that “[n]either party forwards a technical meaning for
‘when’ in the applicable industry”); James R. Barney, In Search of “Ordinary Meaning,” 85 J. Pat.
& Trademark Off. Soc’y 101, 124 (2003) (arguing that dictionary definitions are “entitled to a
‘heavy presumption’ of correctness”).
75

76
See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that statutory terms ought to be interpreted contextually rather than “on the basis of which
meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress”).
77

Id.

Unif. Stat. and Rule Constr. Act § 2 (1995) (stating that “[a] word or phrase that has
acquired a technical or particular meaning in a particular context has that meaning if it is used
in that context”); Norman J. Singer et al., Statutes and Statutory Construction 474 (7th
ed. 2007) (“In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, or other overriding evidence of
a different meaning, technical terms or terms of art used in a statute are presumed to have their
technical meaning.”) (citations omitted).
78

79

529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000).

80

Id.

See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118 (2000) (finding that “engaged in
commerce” had acquired a narrower meaning based on its statutory context and particular purpose).
81
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such specialized meaning absent evidence in either the surrounding language of
the statute or legislative intent.82
The Wyoming Supreme Court makes the same distinction between plain
and specialized meaning as the United States Supreme Court.83 The court reads
a statute as clear and unambiguous if reasonable persons are able to agree on its
meaning.84 Conversely, technical terms, or terms-of-art, are to be assigned their
technical, context-informed meaning unless the Legislature intended differently.85
Wyoming courts have deferred to context to determine the particular meaning
of a term-of-art.86 Additionally, Wyoming courts have followed the United
States Supreme Court in recognizing that legal terms are especially to be contextually defined.87

The Rule of Lenity
According to the interpretive canon of lenity, in criminal cases where two
reasonable interpretations of a statute exist, one inculpating and the other
exculpating a defendant, a court should employ the exculpatory interpretation.88
One legal scholar has called the rule of lenity “[t]he traditional rule for construing
criminal statutes.” 89 Justice Holmes declared that it is the principle of fair warning

82
See W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 91 n.5 (1991) (finding that because
“attorneys’ fees” were not part of the contextual language of the Handicapped Children’s Protection
Act, the term should not be construed to be a subset of reasonable expenses).

See Weber v. State, 261 P.3d 225, 226 (Wyo. 2011); Wesaw v. Quality Maint., 19 P.3d 500,
506 (Wyo. 2001) (citing In re Claim of Prasad, 11 P.3d 344, 347 (Wyo. 2000)); Pierson v. State,
956 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864–65 (Wyo. 1992)).
83

See Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm’n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043
(Wyo. 1993).
84

See Williams Prod. RMT Co. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 107 P.3d 179, 185–86 (Wyo.
2005); Amoco Prod. Co. v. State, 751 P.2d 379, 382 (Wyo. 1988); supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85

See Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (2008) (stating that the words
“arbitrary” and “capricious” must be understood in context as terms-of-art under administrative
review statute).
86

See Morris v. CMS Oil & Gas Co., 227 P.3d 325, 339 (2010) (citing Buckhannon Bd. &
Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (stating that words
that have acquired a specialized meaning in the legal context must be accorded their legal meaning)).
87

88
See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (stating that a “tie must go to the
defendant” when interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes). “The maxim that penal statutes should
be narrowly construed is one of the oldest canons of interpretation[,]” dating back at least to the
Sixteenth Century. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev.
109, 128 (2010).
89

Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 57, 58 (1998).
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that motivates the lenity rule.90 The United States Supreme Court has stated that
“where text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government’s position
is unambiguously correct,” a court should “apply the rule of lenity and resolve the
ambiguity in [the defendant’s] favor.” 91 Lenity is “based on concern about one
provision in the Constitution: the Fifth (and Fourteenth) Amendment’s guarantee
of procedural due process, specifically the right to notice.” 92
Congress fulfills its legislative role by defining crimes by statute, whereas
judges lack the power to expand a statute’s reach by interpreting it to include
activity not clearly covered in the statute under examination.93 As the United
States Supreme Court phrased the canon’s philosophy in McNally v. United States,
“[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has.” 94
Courts recognizing lenity place limitations on its application, making clear that
the canon is not to be interpreted as a “get out of jail free card” to criminals simply
because a statute has more than one possible interpretation.95 Both interpretations
must be fair and reasonable.96 Many courts only apply the rule after the court
has sought every other possible guideline for meaning.97 Moreover, a mere lack
of meticulous drafting does not justify lenity; the United States Supreme Court
has said that the “grammatical possibility” of a defendant’s interpretation does
not command a resort to the rule of lenity if the interpretation proffered by
the defendant reflects “an implausible reading of the congressional purpose.” 98
Courts are also required to exhaust other interpretive tools before applying lenity,
so that the mere existence of some statutory ambiguity is insufficient to warrant
its application in favor of a defendant. Before lenity is applied, a court must

McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) (“Although it is not likely
that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable
that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand,
of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible
the line should be clear.”).
90

91

United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994).

92

Linda D. Jellum, Mastering Statutory Interpretation 237 (2008).

Id. at 238; see United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971) (finding a burden on
Congress to make statutory language more precise in criminal codes).
93

94

483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987).

United States v. Block, 452 F. Supp. 907, 911 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (citing Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577 (1977); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 217 (1976);
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 832 (1974); Bass, 404 U.S. at 350–51; United States v.
Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971); United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1966);
United States v. Standard Oil, 384 U.S. 224, 225 (1966); United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 82
(1964); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1977)).
95

96

Jellum, supra note 92, at 238.

97

Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995).

98

Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316 (1998).
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determine that it can do no more than guess at legislative intent.99 A court will
ideally attempt to discern that meaning from the words used, and from applicable
legislative materials.100
It is true that the Supreme Court has occasionally subordinated lenity, at
times raising the bar for ambiguity to heights unattainable by most defendants. In
Muscarello v. United States, for example, the Court defined the lenity threshold as
the “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” of a statute.101 When traditional guidelines
fail, however, and after having appealed to ordinary or technical meaning and
any discernible legislative intent,102 the Court will apply the canon. In United
States v. Santos, Justice Scalia outlined two principles reflected in the lenity canon:
“that no citizen should be . . . [punished] for violati[ng] . . . a statute whose
commands are uncertain,” and that courts should not “mak[e] criminal law in
Congress’s stead.”103 When properly applied, lenity not only provides fair notice
to defendants, but also “reinforce[s] the notion that only the legislature has the
power to define what conduct is criminal and what conduct is not.”104
Although some state legislatures, frustrated with the effects of narrow
interpretations of criminal statutes,105 have eliminated the rule of lenity,106
Wyoming’s has not. As recently as July 2011, in State v. Juarez, the Wyoming
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s suppression of evidence based on the
ambiguity of section 31-5-217.107 The defendant’s traffic stop for failure to signal
when merging from an entrance ramp onto the interstate and the “subsequent
search of . . . [the] vehicle yielded nine pounds of marijuana.”108 The defendant
moved to suppress the evidence, and the district court granted the motion.109 The
Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the decision, applying the rule of lenity, and
concluded that the statute did not clearly require motorists to signal when merging
99

Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998).

See Daniel A. Per-Lee, Annotation, Supreme Court’s Views as to the “Rule of Lenity” in the
Construction of Criminal Statutes, 62 L. Ed. 2d 827, 828–37 (1981) (discussing and listing compre
hensive authority on the canon of lenity).
100

101

Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994) (stating the rule of lenity applies
when other canons fail to resolve ambiguity and that the Court is unwilling to apply lenity under
the “mere possibility” of alternative construction).
102

103

553 U.S. 507, 513 (2008).

104

Solan, supra note 89, at 58.

105

See id.

Laws in Oregon, California, and New York prohibit the application of lenity in criminal
cases. Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.025(2) (2009); Cal. Penal Code § 4 (West 1988); N.Y. Penal Law
§ 5 (McKinney 1998).
106

107

256 P.3d 517, 520 (Wyo. 2011).

108

Id. at 518.

109

Id.
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onto an interstate roadway.110 The court relied on well-established precedent that,
to be enforceable, “statutes are required to provide good notice of the conduct
that is required.”111 The court reasoned that it could not discern the intent of
the Legislature on the question of whether merging constituted turning, and
“[h]ad the Legislature intended to require a signal . . . it would have stated its
intent more clearly.”112 In so finding, the court applied the rule of lenity and
held that the statute did not require motorists to signal while merging onto an
interstate highway. The court cited the district court’s reasoning, which implied
that there must be a positive “reason to believe the Wyoming Legislature necessarily
intended the use of a turn signal.”113 The decision in Juarez was consistent
with the Wyoming Supreme Court’s reasoning that proper statutory language
“provides notice to citizens of what conduct is prohibited” 114 and that a statute is
unconstitutionally vague if people of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application.115
Like other jurisdictions, Wyoming will not automatically apply the lenity
canon and allow defendants to suggest alternative meanings to statutory language
without a finding of genuine ambiguity.116 In Jones v. State, the court found that
the term “after” in section 6-2-501(f )(ii) of the Wyoming Statutes, specifying a
maximum five-year prison term and $2000 fine for a second or subsequent battery
offense against a household member subsequent to a conviction for a similar
offense during the previous ten years, was not ambiguous. And the rule of lenity
therefore had no role to play.117 However, when finding ambiguity after exercising
other interpretive tools, the Wyoming Supreme Court has taken a strong position
that such ambiguity should not merely be weighed in favor of defendants, but that
it should be resolved in favor of defendants, and that defendants should “receive the
benefit of any ambiguity.”118

110

Id. at 521.

111

Id. at 520 (emphasis added).

112

Id.

113

Id. at 519.

114

Dougherty v. State, 239 P.3d 1176, 1181 (Wyo. 2010) (citation omitted).

See Smith v. State, 964 P.2d 421, 422 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Hobbes v. State, 757 P.2d 1008,
1011 (Wyo. 1988)); see also Shafer v. State, 197 P.3d 1247, 1251 (Wyo. 2008) (determining the
inclusion of “attempt” in one statute and the omission of “attempt” in another implies legislative
intent to cover “attempt” in one instance and not the other).
115

116
See Crain v. State, 218 P.3d 934, 940 (Wyo. 2009) (citing Fraternal Order of Eagles
Sheridan v. State, 126 P.3d 847, 855–56 (Wyo. 2006)) (“[W]here the statute under consideration
is unambiguous, the rule of lenity has no role to play.”); Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 564 (Wyo.
1989) (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342 (1981) (“Lenity thus serves only as an
aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.”)).
117

256 P.3d 536, 541–42 (Wyo. 2011).

118

Schafer, 197 P.3d at 1251 (emphasis added).
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Thus, in Schafer v. State, the court reversed a conviction of aggravated battery
and assault because, in merging a general attempt charge with a specific assault
and battery charge, the State had contravened the intent of the Legislature.119
After finding that the Legislature did not intend the general attempt statute to
apply to the aggravated assault and battery statute,120 the court reasoned that, at
the very least, the language dealing with the concept of attempt in the aggravated
assault and battery statute is ambiguous. That ambiguity necessitated applying
the rule of lenity.121
The interpretive canon of lenity is designed to give defendants the benefit
of the doubt when, after deploying other tools and methods of interpretation,
a court is unable to discern the clear definition of statutory language to the
exclusion of another equally sound interpretation. Motivated by the Fifth
Amendment’s requirement of notice, the canon assumes defendants should not
have to guess at the meaning of a law before they discern that they are obeying
or violating it. Although limited to instances where statutory meaning is indeed
vague after all available methods of interpretation are exhausted, both the United
States Supreme Court and the Wyoming Supreme Court use the canon of
lenity to avoid expanding statutes’ meanings beyond that intended by the legislative branch.

Surplusage
Based on the presumption that a legislative body would not waste words when
writing laws,122 the canonical rule against surplusage, or “superfluity,” discourages
interpretations of a statute that render some words in the statute meaningless.123
Courts consider a rule against superfluous language important when two similar
but nonidentical terms are found in a statute. Courts assume that legislative
bodies use different terms in statutes because they intended each of the terms to
have particular, nonsuperfluous meanings.124 The United States Supreme Court
has noted that, because of the need for precision in convictions and sentencing,
surplusage should especially be avoided when interpreting criminal statutes.125
119

Id. at 1250.

120

Id. at 1251.

121

Id.

See Stephen M. Durden, Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33 Campbell
L. Rev. 115, 122 (2010) (stating that the “‘superfluity canon’ . . . presume[s] the legislat[ors] to
[not] waste words when enacting laws”).
122

See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, (2001) (“We are ‘reluctan[t] to treat statutory
terms as surplusage[,]’ in any setting.”); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338–39 (1979)
(stating that interpretation ignoring disjunctive “or” and robbing term “property” of independent
meaning would violate the necessity to “give effect . . . to every word Congress used”).
123

124
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995); Astoria Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v.
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991).
125

Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140–41 (1995).
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As an example, Wyoming’s bribery statute provides that a public servant
commits bribery if he or she “solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary
benefit” in exchange for a vote or other action favorable to the person offering the
bribe.126 A defendant’s claim that a bilateral agreement is necessary to convict a
public official of bribery would arguably render the word “solicits” in the statute
superfluous, since unilateral action is implicit in the definition of “solicit.”127
Thus, when faced with two reasonable interpretations of a bribery statute, a court
is likely to prefer the interpretation that allows “solicits” to have some unique
meaning, rather than the interpretation that renders that word superfluous.128
The surplusage canon is not absolute, and there are reasons to exercise
caution before applying it. Legislatures do not always draft statutes with care;129 a
legislative body may not have deliberated over the drafting of a statute sufficiently
to assume that each word has a distinct meaning, or that redundant words have
been removed before the final draft of the legislation is adopted into law.130
Additionally, the rule against surplusage is typically subordinated to other rules if
there is a chance that the rule against surplusage could contradict the intent of the
legislation. This is particularly true if the additional words are considered “minor”
in the face of the ordinary meaning of rest of the statute.131 Courts will avoid the
canon if its application requires adding meaning to a statute that is not warranted
by legislative history or intent.132 As a general rule, the Supreme Court adheres
to the surplusage canon when there is no overriding reason to reject the canon,
and expresses “a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render

126

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a)(ii) (2011).

See Blakeman v. State, 100 P.3d 1229, 1234–35 (Wyo. 2004) (finding that the plain
meaning of “solicit” was to ask for the purpose of receiving and noting that other jurisdictions also
interpret the term unilaterally).
127

See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140 (stating that judges should not assume a word’s inclusion in a
statute to be of no consequence).
128

See John F. Manning, Exchange, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L.
Rev. 70, 98 (2006) (“Nor can one maintain that all of the canons of construction readily invoked
by textualists . . . reflect legislators’ actual knowledge of the contents of legislation.”).
129

See Jack L. Landau, Oregon as a Laboratory of Statutory Interpretation, 47 Willamette L.
Rev. 563, 570 (2011) (arguing that legislators sometimes intend to be redundant).
130

See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 812 (1983) (arguing that statutes, like judicial opinions and academic
articles, often contain surplusage as a result of harmless oversight in drafting and “the strains of the
negotiating process”); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn
Its Lonely Eyes to You, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 561, 572 (1992) (suggesting that the surplusage canon is
often contrary to real life experience).
131

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 153 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that
“the canon against surplusage merely helps decide between competing permissible interpretations of
an ambiguous statute” and does not justify adding requirements not contemplated by Congress).
132
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superfluous other provisions in the same enactment.”133 This reluctance becomes
especially determinative when the term in question is “pivotal” to interpreting
the statute.134
The Wyoming Supreme Court has used the surplusage canon, noting,
for example, in Deloges v. State that “every word, clause, and sentence must
be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous.”135 In that case, an
appellant challenged his denial of additional benefits subsequent to an award
of permanent total disability benefits.136 The court rejected a reading of the
State’s disability statute that would have required compensation greater than one
hundred percent of disability, because such a reading would have rendered the
statutory language absurd (insofar as it is absurd to believe a disability statute
is designed to compensate the disabled for more than one hundred percent of
his disability).137 In State Bd. of Equalization v. Cheyenne Newspapers, the court
was asked to address whether supplies used in the production of newspapers
were exempt from taxation.138 Wyoming’s 1957 Use Tax Act exempted particular
property from taxation, including “‘[t]angible personal property . . . which directly
enters into or becomes an ingredient or component part of any manufactured
article or substance or commodity . . . .’”139 The Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation had assessed a tax against Cheyenne Newspapers on the cost of
photographic equipment used to produce printed newspapers, claiming that, since
the newspapers only consisted of ink and paper, the photographic equipment was
not part of the papers’ finished product.140 The majority on the court reasoned
that such an interpretation would render the phrase “which directly enters
into” as mere surplusage, implying that the Legislature intended that phrase to
have the same meaning as “becomes an ingredient or component part of.”141
Since the surplusage canon assumes legislatures intend two separate clauses to
imply two separate concepts, the court concluded that such an interpretation
was unreasonable.142

133

Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990).

See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174–76 (2001) (observing that the Court has a duty
to give effect to every word of a statute and avoid treating statutory terms as surplusage).
134

135

750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988).

136

Id. at 1330.

137

Id. at 1332.

138

611 P.2d 805, 815 (Wyo. 1980).

139

Id. at 807.

140

Id. at 806.

141

Id. at 812–13.

142

Id. at 810.
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Principal Case
On March 12, 2009, a Wyoming State Trooper stopped Colorado resident
Daniel Joseph Burns for speeding in Laramie County.143 Burns was found to be
in possession of more than three ounces of marijuana, and arrested for violating
Wyoming Statute section 35-7-1031(c)(iii).144 Prior to trial, Burns made known
his intention to argue, as a defense, that the marijuana was obtained pursuant to
the prescription or order of a practitioner in Colorado under that state’s medical
marijuana law.145 The prosecution responded by filing a motion in limine to
exclude Burns’s proposed jury instruction, which set forth that defense theory,
and for which Burns had offered his marijuana registry card and physician
certification. After a hearing, the district court of Laramie County granted the
prosecution’s motion, prohibiting Burns from presenting at trial any evidence and
defense theories to the effect that he lawfully obtained his marijuana pursuant
to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner in Colorado.146 The prohibited
evidence included Burns’s “debilitating medical condition,” his status on the
medical marijuana registry maintained by the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment, and the medical efficacy of marijuana in general.147
Burns argued, in response to the motion, that the Colorado registry card and
physician’s certification constituted a valid prescription or order as contemplated
by section 35-7-1031(c) and thus should be considered a statutorily recognized
defense against the possession charge that he was entitled to present at trial.148 The
parties then entered into an agreement for a conditional guilty plea, preserving
Burns’s right to appeal the exclusion of his affirmative defense.149
Burns appealed his suspended prison sentence to the Wyoming Supreme
Court, which, on January 19, 2011, affirmed his conviction, holding that the
Wyoming statute did not exempt a defendant from criminal liability even if the
defendant obtained a legitimate medical marijuana exception under Colorado
law. The issue before the court was whether the fact that a defendant obtained
a Schedule I controlled substance pursuant to a valid order of a practitioner in
another state constituted a defense under section 35-7-1031(c).150 The court
answered that a defendant’s possession of a valid order of a practitioner did not

143

Burns v. State, 246 P.3d 283, 284 (Wyo. 2011).

144

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) (2009).

145

Burns, 246 P.3d at 284.

146

Id.

147

Id. at 284–85.

Id. at 285. Burns was referring to the statutory exception that existed prior to the Wyoming
Legislature’s removal of the exception in 2011. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2009); supra
note 3 (explaining the old statutory exception).
148

149

Burns, 246 P.3d at 285.

150

Id. at 284.
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constitute a defense under the statute, since marijuana possession for any reason
remained illegal in the State of Wyoming.151 Such a decision required that the
court disregard the exception contained, at the time, in section 35-7-1031(c)(iii)
allowing for the possession of marijuana “obtained directly from or pursuant to
a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice.”152
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Golden first noted that Burns’s
appellate brief did not sufficiently analyze the meaning of section 35-7-1031(c).153
The court nevertheless committed to perform that analysis. The court noted that
considerable deference is afforded the trial court in evidentiary decisions such as
the granting of in limine motions.154 The burden of proof for abuse of discretion
is on the side losing the motion.155
The district court had determined the exception in section 35-7-1031(c) did
not apply to Burns’s Colorado medical registry card and physician’s certification,
because they were not the equivalent of a “prescription or order” as intended
under the statute.156 At this point, however, rather than analyzing the definitions
of “prescription” and “order” in the statute and evaluating the district court’s
reasoning, the court abruptly declared that such analysis was not necessary,
since “[t]he possession of marijuana, even for medical purposes, remains illegal”
in Wyoming and under federal law.157 Therefore, the court reasoned, “it would
be illegal for a physician to prescribe or order, in any sense, the possession
of marijuana.”158
The court resolved the seeming inconsistency of the illegality of a physician
prescribing or ordering marijuana with the fact that some Colorado residents
legally possess and use the drug, by pointing out that Colorado law merely
requires a physician’s “certification” that a patient might benefit from the use of
marijuana.159 The court added that the State of Colorado, rather than a physician,
actually qualifies patients for marijuana use.160 Since the action of the physician
does not directly determine the potential possession of marijuana by the patient

151

Id.

152

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2009).

153

Burns, 246 P.3d at 285.

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

Id. at 286.

157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

Id.
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(a point punctuated by the language of the physician’s certification, stating that
it is not a prescription), the court reasoned the exception provided in section
35-7-1031(c) did not apply.161
The court’s reasoning consisted of a logical, almost syllogistic progression
of thought based on its implicit understanding of the language of section
35-7-1031(c), its interpretation of the meaning of “prescription or order” in the
statute, and its understanding of the process of legitimate acquisition of marijuana
in Colorado.162 The Wyoming exception required the prescription or order of a
physician.163 Colorado law does not permit a physician to prescribe or order the
possession of marijuana.164 Therefore, the court concluded, Burns did not have a
prescription or order for marijuana, and the Wyoming exception did not apply.165

Analysis
In Burns, the Wyoming Supreme Court inappropriately defined the word
“order,” rendered language in the statutory exception of section 35-7-1031(c)
meaningless, and ignored recognized medical terminology. In so doing, the
court made an inferential leap in closing a loophole that only the Wyoming
Legislature could close. The statutory exception did not explicitly require that
a person possessing medical marijuana receive that marijuana from a physician
in Wyoming,166 but the court’s decision appealed to the categorical illegality of
a Wyoming physician prescribing or ordering that a patient use marijuana.167
Substantial difference of opinion exists as to what “order” means in a medical
context,168 and although Burns may not have acquired his marijuana in the same
way one might acquire an antibiotic or other prescribed medication, he clearly
acquired it pursuant to the recommendation of a physician, without whose
approval he would not have possessed it.169
Had Burns been allowed to offer his defense, a jury could have decided
whether Burns had merely intended to travel through Wyoming with his
medical supplies on his person like any other patient traveling through the state,

161

Id.

162

Id. at 285–86.

163

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2009), supra note 3 (explaining the former statute).

164

Burns, 246 P.3d at 286.

165

Id. at 285–86.

166

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2009), supra note 3 (explaining the previous statute).

167

Burns, 246 P.3d at 286.

168

See infra, notes 177–83, 207–15 and accompanying text.

Brief of Appellant at 18, Burns, 246 P.3d 283 (No. S-10-0053), 2010 WL 1783749.
Colorado only approves a medical marijuana license based upon the recommendation of a medical
practitioner. See Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(3)(b)(I).
169
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assuming in good faith that he had done everything legally necessary to acquire
his medicine; or whether he had intended to bring illegal narcotics into the state
for more nefarious purposes.170 Instead, the court attributed a narrow, inculpatory
meaning to the language in the statutory exception, rendering the word “order”
indistinguishable from the word “prescription,”171 precluding those legally allowed
to possess marijuana in Colorado from bringing a practitioner-recommended
medication into Wyoming.
This note argues that the Wyoming Supreme Court had good reason to, and
should have, interpreted the word “order” in the statutory exception as a medical
term-of-art.172 Such a reading would have indicated that a Colorado physician’s
approval or recommendation of medical marijuana satisfied the requirement in the
statutory exception. The court also had good reasons to apply the rule of lenity 173
to the statutory exception, acknowledging the language of the exception was
vague concerning whether a Colorado resident who obtained marijuana pursuant
to the order of a physician could legally possess marijuana in Wyoming.174 Lastly,
the court ought to have applied the surplusage canon175 to distinguish the words
“prescription” and “order” in the statute, a distinction sufficient to interpret the
Colorado practitioner’s recommendation as an “order.”176

The Court Should Have Interpreted “Order” as a Term-of-Art
The Wyoming Statutes recognize the distinction between plain meaning and
terms-of-art, and the Wyoming Supreme Court has applied that distinction in its
interpretation of statutory language.177 In section 35-7-1031(c), the words “order”
and “prescription” refer to the directives of a medical practitioner. Wyoming’s
Standards of Practice statutes for medical ethics include, in section 33-23-101(d),
the language: “It is unlawful for any person to dispense, replace or duplicate
ophthalmic lenses or any contact lenses without a prescription or order from a

170
Brief of Appellant, supra note 169, at 11 (“Only if possessor attempts or intends to
distribute the substance does he lose the defense of an authorized prescription.”).
171

See infra notes 207–15 and accompanying text.

172

See infra notes 177–84 and accompanying text.

173

See infra notes 185–203 and accompanying text.

174

See infra notes 195–204 and accompanying text.

175

Durden, supra note 122, at 122.

176

See infra notes 204–14 and accompanying text.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-103(a)(i) (2012) (“Words and phrases shall be taken in their
ordinary and usual sense, but technical words and phrases having a peculiar and appropriate
meaning in law shall be understood according to their technical import.”); see Williams Prod. RMT.
Co. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 107 P.3d 179,185–86 (Wyo. 2005) (“In addition, when construing
technical terms contained within statutes, we look to the meaning ascribed to those terms in the
applicable field.”); Blackmore v. Davis Oil Co., 671 P.2d 334, 339–41 (Wyo. 1983) (Rooney,
C.J., dissenting).
177
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physician or optometrist.”178 Section 33-43-102(a)(iii) speaks of “services . . . in
accordance with the prescription or verbal order of a physician or other authorized
health care professional.”179 Section 35-22-205 reads: “A cardiopulmonary
resuscitation directive for any person who is admitted to a health care facility
shall be implemented as a physician’s order concerning resuscitation as directed
by the person in the cardiopulmonary resuscitation directive, pending further
physicians’ orders.”180 These statutes suggest that an “order” is the gesture of a
medical professional.
Inexplicably, however, the Burns court accepted without comment the plain
meaning, dictionary definition of “order” offered by the State, defining “order” as
“command.”181 Whether a physician’s order is as unambiguously pronounced as a
physician’s prescription (a question explored in the section on surplusage below),
medical directives, instructions, or authorizations are not simply “commands,”
but instructions and guidelines contingent on particular medical situations. The
Wyoming Supreme Court has previously determined that whether a term has a
technical or plain meaning is a question to be resolved by the finder of fact.182
Since Burns’s initial defense (based on his acquisition of the marijuana pursuant
to a physician’s order) was rejected by the district court prior to trial, Burns did
not have the opportunity to present evidence to a jury that the term “order” was
included in the statutory exception with a medical context in mind.183 Because
Burns was not allowed to demonstrate this context at trial, the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s deferral to the plain meaning interpretation imposed a general definition
on the term where a contextual, term-of-art definition would have been a more
appropriate reflection of the statutory language.184 This failure to apply the
term-of-art canon of construction, moreover, played a pivotal role in the ultimate
holding in the case.

Ambiguity in the Statutory Exception Justified Lenity
The rule of lenity, a canon of statutory construction holding that ambiguities
in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of defendants, exists to protect
defendants from the possibility that they might hear, but not understand, the
178

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-23-101(d) (2009).

179

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-43-102(a)(iii) (2009).

180

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-22-205 (2009).

Burns v. State, 246 P.3d 283, 286 (Wyo. 2011) (“Generally, our first step would be to
analyze the definitions of ‘prescription’ and ‘order’ as used in the statute. However, in this case there
is no need to engage in that analysis.”).
181

182
Powder River Coal Co. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 145 P.3d 442, 448 (Wyo. 2006)
(“Whether a term has such a technical meaning is a question of fact to be proved.”).
183

Burns, 246 P.3d at 285.

See Williams Prod. RMT Co. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 107 P.3d 179, 185 (Wyo. 2005)
(“[W]hen construing technical terms contained within statutes, we look to the meaning ascribed to
those terms in the applicable field.”).
184
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law.185 The rule is applied when a court is unable to derive an unambiguous
interpretation of statutory language after exploring the language using other
standard interpretive tools.186 A plain meaning or term-of-art exploration of the
statutory exception in section 35-7-1031(c) would not have resolved the question
of whether the “practitioner” in the provision had to be in Wyoming, or could
have been based in another state. Wyoming’s Controlled Substances Statute does
not define “physician,” “practitioner,” or other terms associated with the medical
profession.187 A reasonable person living in a state allowing medical marijuana,
upon reading Wyoming’s statutory exception, could well have assumed that
the authorization of a physician from a neighboring state was a sufficient guard
against prosecution for possession of medical marijuana, particularly when that
marijuana was not being smoked, sold, transferred, or openly displayed within the
state of Wyoming.188
The statutory exception specified that the excepted substance must be obtained
pursuant to the prescription or order of a practitioner.189 The court in Burns,
however, used Wyoming’s categorical prohibition of marijuana to conclude that
there could be no conceivable circumstances where a Wyoming physician could
prescribe marijuana.190 In doing so, the court seemed to suggest there were no
conceivable circumstances where the exception could apply, rendering questions
as to whether the law applied to Schedule I substances obtained pursuant to the
authoritative pronouncement of a physician outside of Wyoming obsolete.
Prior to the Wyoming Legislature’s elimination of the statutory exception, the
law read, “[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a
controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant
to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this act.”191 The
language of the exception did not clarify whether the “practitioner” must practice
in Wyoming, or whether the patient must acquire the controlled substance in
Wyoming.192 It did not provide for the possibility of acquiring a prescription or

185

Jellum, supra note 92, at 237.

186

Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995).

187

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1001 to -1057 (2009).

See Brief of Appellant, Burns, supra note 169, at 11 (noting that neither federal nor
Wyoming law prohibits interstate filling of prescriptions, and that residents of other states regularly
drive through Wyoming carrying their prescriptions with them).
188

189
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2009); supra note 3 (discussing the former statutory exception).
190

See Burns, 246 P.3d at 286.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2009); see supra note 3 (discussing the former statutory exception).
191

192

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2009).
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order for a medication in another state, something that is not uncommon in rural
areas or in border communities.193 Because of this ambiguity, lenity would have
been an appropriate interpretive tool for the court.194
The Wyoming Supreme Court has established criteria for the application of
lenity to a vague statute.195 A statute is vague if people of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.196 Given
these criteria, it was unreasonable for the court to limit the affirmative defense
to substances only acquired in Wyoming, obtained pursuant to an order in
Wyoming.197 Wyomingites face unique challenges related to rural health care
access.198 Moreover, out-of-state residents bring their drugs into the state when
visiting or traveling through. Since residents sometimes obtain medical services,
including prescription drugs, from neighboring states, and since the statutory
exception does not specify that the practitioner or the drug must originate in
Wyoming, it is reasonable to suppose that two people of common intelligence
might, upon reading section 35-7-1031(c)(iii) prior to its elimination by the
Legislature, have drawn divergent conclusions concerning whether the substance
in question must be obtained from a physician in Wyoming.
Additionally, if the purpose of lenity is to avoid holding a defendant
“accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain,”199 or to
provide fair warning to citizens that they might be breaking a law (or be uncovered

193

See infra note 198 and accompanying text.

See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 515 (2008) (“When interpreting a criminal
statute, we do not play the part of a mindreader.”).
194

195
See Schafer v. State, 197 P.3d 1247, 1251 (Wyo. 2008) (“Under the rule of lenity, criminal
defendants receive the benefit of any ambiguity.”).
196
See Britt v. State, 752 P.2d 426, 428 (Wyo. 1988) (“The constitutional standard for
vagueness of a criminal statute has been defined by this court. ‘An ordinance or statute is void
for vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary sensibility fair notice that the contemplated
conduct is forbidden. . . .’ While there is a strong presumption of constitutionality, . . . ‘a statute is
unconstitutionally vague when ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.’ . . . The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally
liable for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’”) (citations omitted);
Hobbes v. State, 757 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Wyo. 1988).

See Burns v. State, 246 P.3d 283, 286 (Wyo. 2011). The court reasoned that the illegality of
possession within a jurisdiction means “it would be illegal for a physician to prescribe or order, in any
sense, the possession of marijuana.” Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 198–203 (demonstrating
that because the statutory language was ambiguous, the court should have applied the rule of lenity,
erred on the side of the defendant, and left it up to the Legislature to clarify the language of the
statutory exception if it desired to do so).
197

See Rural and Frontier Health, Wyo. Dep’t of Health, http://www.health.wyo.gov/rfhd/
index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (providing information on the challenges of rural health care
including lack of primary services, long drives to care providers, and sustainability of facilities in
small communities).
198

199

Santos, 553 U.S. at 515.
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by an exception), then the totality of the language in section 35-7-1031(c) was
insufficient to guarantee that warning or certainty. One may “obtain directly”
a substance from a practitioner anywhere, and there are no other Wyoming
laws prohibiting a Wyoming citizen from obtaining medical services, including
prescription drugs, from other states.200 Burns should not have had to consult
a Wyoming attorney before driving through the state with his legally obtained
substance on his person.201
In Juarez, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that section 31-5-217 was
sufficient to warrant lenity because there was no positive “basis in the statute at
issue to conclude that a motorist is absolutely required to signal” when merging
onto an interstate highway.202 Similarly, there was no positive reason to believe
the Wyoming Legislature intended section 35-7-1031(c) to apply only to in-state
physicians prescribing controlled substances.203 Because these two statutes are
equally ambiguous, the court should have applied the rule of lenity, erred on the
side of the defendant, and left it up to the Legislature to clarify the language of
the statutory exception if it desired to do so.

The Court’s Interpretation Rendered “Order” Superfluous
The canonical rule against surplusage (surplusage canon) is based on the
notion that, if a legislative body puts two words alongside one another in a statute,
each word has its own unique meaning.204 Absent an indication that legislators
intended some terms in a statute to be restatements or clarifications of other
words, courts ought to defer to interpretations that do not render certain terms in
a statute inoperative or superfluous. 205
Prior to its legislative elimination in 2011, the exception in section 35-7-1031
(c) listed two actions by a physician that could serve as the basis for the affirmative
defense: The substance may be acquired pursuant to either a “prescription” or
an “order.” The State’s appellate brief defined “order” using Webster’s Dictionary,

200

See Brief of Appellant, Burns, supra note 169, at 11.

See Dougherty v. State, 239 P.3d 1176, 1181 (Wyo. 2010) (indicating the importance of
providing notice of prohibited conduct); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 976 (Wyo. 1988) (discussing
the importance of notice in alerting the public to conduct regarded as illegal under state law); supra
text accompanying note 103.
201

202

State v. Juarez, 256 P.3d 517, 521 (Wyo. 2011).

203

See Brief of Appellant, Burns, supra note 169, at 11.

204

Durden, supra note 122, at 115.

205

United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 (2007).
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assuming the plain language canon was sufficient.206 That definition, which is
stripped of any context, medical or otherwise, was “specific rule, regulation, or
authoritative direction: COMMAND.”207
Interpreting “order” to be a “command” or “regulation” makes it
indistinguishable from “prescription,” which Webster’s defines as “a prescribing
or dictating,” and in a more specifically medical context, “a written direction
for the preparation and use of a medicine.” 208 The similarity in language to the
State’s definition of “order” is impressive: prescribing, dictating, authoritatively
directing. A reader of the two definitions would be hard pressed to articulate a
meaningful difference between them, but the surplusage canon directs courts to
assume that the Legislature intended the two terms to have different meanings.209
Moreover, the two terms mean quite different things. In a medical context,
it is accepted terminology that the “order” of a physician or other medical
professional is similar to an “authorization.” 210 Thus, in a handbook on restraining
elderly patients, “doctor’s order” is used interchangeably with “physician’s
authorization.” 211 Similarly, in a reference manual for Los Angeles County’s
Emergency Medical Services, paramedics are instructed to interpret “Federal Law
restricts this device to sale by or the order of a physician” to mean the requirement
of “specific physician authorization.” 212 More salient to the legal usage of the terms,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas’s decision in
Wallace v. Methodist Hospital Systems repeatedly uses “order” and “authorization”
interchangeably to describe the hospital’s assertion that a nurse violated hospital
rules by undertaking procedures “without a doctor’s authorization” in failing “to
obtain a physician’s order for the insertion or removal of a nasogastric feeding

206

Brief of Appellee at 10, Burns, 246 P.3d 283 (No. S-10-0053), 2010 WL 2395612.

207

Id. (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary 808 (3d ed. 1977)).

208

Webster’s New International Dictionary 1954 (2d ed. 1956).

United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect,
if possible, to every clause and word of a statute . . . .’”); see State Bd. of Equalization v. Cheyenne
Newspapers, Inc., 611 P.2d 805, 810 (Wyo. 1980) (“It cannot be reasonably expected that the
legislature intended [two words in the same statute] to have identical meanings.”); supra notes
122–42 and accompanying text.
209

Medicaid SSI Benefits and Services, iCare, http://www.icare-wi.org/members/ssibenefits.
aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (“Some services may require a doctor’s order or a prior authorization.”).
210

211
Jan L. Warner & Jan Collins, Restraining Elderly Residents Presents Very Special Concerns,
Nextsteps, http://www.lifemanagement.com/nsa4.8.2078/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
212
Supply and Resupply of Designated EMS Provider Units, Reference No. 701, Los Angeles
Cnty. Dep’t of Health Servs. (Feb. 15, 2010), http://ems.lacounty.gov/policies/ref700/701.pdf.
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tube” and other infractions.213 These examples suggest, at the very least, that a
physician’s “order” might reasonably be interpreted to be of a different category
of meaning than the more forceful and authoritative physician’s “prescription.”
Either that difference was specifically contemplated by the Wyoming Legislature
when it drafted section 35-7-1031(c), in which case the surplusage canon would
preclude conflation of “prescription” and “order,” or the meaning of “order” is
ambiguous, in which case the court ought to have applied the doctrine of lenity.214
Unfortunately, the court only pointed out that Burns could not have had a
prescription, an obvious point since the physician’s certification explicitly stated
it was not a prescription.215 It is difficult, however, to understand how that same
certification did not functionally entail a physician’s authorization. Because “order”
is commonly and plainly used in medical terminology to mean authorization, and
because Burns clearly received such an authorization as far as the Colorado law
was concerned,216 the court should have assumed “order” had a meaning distinct
from “prescription.”

Conclusion
Interpretive canons and principles purport to provide clarity in applying
criminal statutes. With an increasing number of states legalizing the medical use
of marijuana, other jurisdictions are faced with choices concerning how to apply
ambiguous statutes, and whether to respect neighboring jurisdictions’ laws. Policy
concerns about marijuana may tempt courts to do the work of legislators in an
effort to prevent encroachment by medical marijuana users into drug-free states.
Such judicial decisions may fail to apply canons such as lenity and surplusage, and
the interpretive norms of terms-of-art, where courts might otherwise do so.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Burns did not adequately consider
the ambiguous language of the statutory exception, the duplicative meaning
of its two key terms, or the legitimacy of the process by which Daniel Joseph
Burns acquired his medical marijuana.217 In this case, Burns should have had
the opportunity to demonstrate to the jury, given his compliance with what he
understood to be the applicable law, that he had acquired his marijuana through
legitimate channels, that he intended to use it legally, and that he could not have
Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 85 F. Supp. 2d 699, 705, 719 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (finding
that using “doctor’s authorization” and “doctor’s order” in successive sentences meant the same
authorization for work to be performed).
213

214
See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); supra notes 122–42, 209 and
accompanying text.

Burns v. State, 246 P.3d 283, 286 n.5 (Wyo. 2011) (“The Physician’s Certification clearly
states that it is not a prescription for marijuana.”); Brief of Appellee, Burns, supra note 206, at 10.
215

216

Brief of Appellant, Burns, supra note 169, at 18.

217

See supra notes 163–215 and accompanying text.
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foreseen that the seemingly clear exception under Wyoming law would not apply
to him.218 In denying Burns that opportunity, the Wyoming Supreme Court
sidestepped the question of the Legislature’s failure to either clarify its statutory
exception, or amend it. Significantly, the Wyoming Legislature took the second
route immediately after Burns was decided, amending the statute to close the
“prescription or order” loophole as it applied to marijuana.219 The Legislature’s
decision raises suspicion that the Burns court was more concerned with protecting
the state from medical marijuana than with statutory interpretation.

218

See supra note 167 and accompanying text.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (2011), supra note 3 (explaining the differences
between the former statute and the amended statute).
219
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